Suppression of the truth

“…who suppress the truth in unrighteousness…” Romans 1:19

The points below are some implications of the truth implied in the above text of Scripture – the truth that all people suppress the truth. I intended to make more specific applications of these points. But they can be applied in so many different ways, so that I thought posting them in the present form would be the most useful.

  1. Truth, when suppressed, doesn’t come through, in some real sense, to the individual who has suppressed it.
  2. If this is so, then a person who has suppressed it may be truly sincerely ignorant of it, though only partially and to a certain degree, and never with wholehearted sincerity; because if he has suppressed it, then it once appeared to him so that he knew it. To whatever extent this is true of anyone, that person is to be pitied.
  3. To whatever extent their ignorance of anything arises from the fact that they have suppressed the truth, their ignorance is shameful, sinful, blameworthy.
  4. To the extent that a person may be truly sincerely ignorant of some truth or other because they have suppressed it (though, if their ignorance has this as its cause, then their ignorance of it is not absolute but only partial, and never wholeheartedly sincere), they may with some true sincerity judge a morally good thing to be bad or vice versa, or enjoy and/or delight in what they ought to loathe (be disturbed by- in their conscience, etc.)) or vice versa. To whatever extent this is true of anyone, they are to be pitied.
  5. To the extent that a person, being partially ignorant of some truth or other because they have suppressed it, judges a thing to be moral good which they ought to judge morally bad or vice versa, or enjoys and/or delights in what they ought to loathe (be disturbed by- in their conscience, etc.)) or vice versa, their so judging or so enjoying or loathing (being disturbed by- in their conscience, etc.)) may be to some extent truly sincere, though it can never be wholeheartedly sincere.
  6. To the extent that a person, being partially ignorant of some truth or other because they have suppressed it, judges a thing to be moral good which they ought to judge morally bad or vice versa, or enjoys and/or delights in what they ought to loathe or vice versa, their so judging or so enjoying or loathing (being disturbed by – in their conscience, etc.) is shameful, sinful, blameworthy.
  7. When a person suppresses certain truths, certain propositions may appear to him to be coherent mutually, which would not appear so to him if he had not suppressed those truths.

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